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EXODUS: ... I 
EXODUS: 
40 YEARS OF DEINSTITUTIONALIZA TION AND THE 
FAILED PROMISE OF COMMUNITY-BASED CARE 
TED FRANKEL t 
ABSTRACT 
The increasing number of Canadians with mental illness who are left 
uncared.for and roaming the streets represents a huge failing that is not 
being seriously addressed in our society. Initially thought to be humane 
and progressive, "deinstitutionalization" has resulted in a very differ-
ent reality for thousands of people with mental illness who have been 
released into the community. Many of those liberated from mental 
institutions and asylums have made an uneasy transition to life on the 
"outside", sometimes with tragic consequences. 
The question for consumers of mental health services now is not 
whether the current .system isfailing but rather what is the best route to 
programs and entitlements that are routinely granted to other disadvan-
taged groups, such as people wUh physical disabilities. Claims 
grounded in Charter section 15 jurisprudence that mentally ill popula-
tions are underserved by existing aftercare programs are one possibil-
ity, although Canadian courts have shown a marked reluctance to 
interfere in the realm of policy-making. In the end only a restructuring 
of priorities - political, social and attitudinal can fully address the 
needs of some of our least understood and empowered citizens, as the 
experience of one Canadian jurisdiction, Nova Scotia, demonstrates so 
well. 
t Ted Frankel graduated from McGill University in 1997 with a B.A. in History and from 
Dalhousie Law School in 2003 with an LL.B. He wishes to thank Professor Archie Kaiser for 
his suggestions and constructive criticism in writing this paper. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Moses said to the people, "Remember this day, when you left Egypt, 
that slave-pen; for sheer strength the Eternal brought you out of this 
place ... (and) swore to your fathers He would give you a land abound-
ing in milk and honey ... " 
Exodus 13:3 
The themes of enslavement and bondage are ones familiar to individuals 
who suffer from mental illness. There is the bondage of the mind, 
especially for those who suffer from depression, mood swings, halluci-
nations, delusions, and other afflictions. There is the bondage of the 
spirit, occasioned by prejudice, discrimination, stigma, and 
marginalization the result of hatred, intolerance, and simple misunder-
standing of mental disability by those who have never felt its grip. 
Finally, and perhaps most devastating of all, there is the bondage and 
subjugation of body and soul which comes when one is institutionalized, 
a process which involves not only the physical aspect of living apart 
from family, friends, and neighbours but also the psychological trauma 
of subordinating one's autonomy one's very free will - to the interests 
of treatment, rehabilitation and recovery. 
For the last forty years there has been a movement afoot to end the 
bondage of forced hospitalization and move towards treatment alterna-
tives which are less restrictive and more humane. Called 
"deinstitutionalization" by some, this movement has seen a veritable 
exodus of psychiatric in-patients from hospitals to seek a new life in the 
community. Yet deinstitutionalization for the thousands who have been 
liberated from psychiatric institutions has meant something more than 
the simple act of leaving. It has meant the promise of community-based 
care with the ultimate goal of reintegration, and it has meant the chal-
lenge of moving forward when these promises have proved hollow. 
This article will endeavour to unpack the many dimensions of 
deinstitutionalization and assess how far we have come in realizing the 
goal of effective, benevolent community-based care and treatment. In 
doing so, deinstitutionalization will be examined as a social construct, a 
policy choice, a legal right, and as a legacy of thousands of individuals 
with mental illness, to be measured in human terms. Although I will 
look at deinstitutionalization broadly as a social and legal phenomenon 
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taking place across Canada and the United States, the efforts of Nova 
Scotia to implement community-based care as a viable substitute for 
institutionalization will be examined more closely. 
Part II will look at the foundations of deinstitutionalization, includ-
ing legislative efforts made to provide for individuals in the community, 
and the often dire consequences of failing to live up to these responsi-
bilities, which include homelessness and violence. 
Whether or not a right to community-based care and/or basic after-
care' exists at all for disabled people in Canada will be addressed in Part 
III, with a comparison made between claims made under the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms and jurisprudence from the United States on the 
same topic. 
Since deinstitutionalization cannot be fully understood apart from 
its context in Canadian lives and communities, Part IV fixes a critical 
gaze on Nova Scotia, examining the legislative framework for mental 
health services in the province, how this has translated into uncertainty 
for Nova Scotians who have been discharged from hospitals and institu-
tions, and what efforts have been made to restructure priorities and 
make more of existing resources. 
The paper will conclude with a look at the potential for individuals 
with mental illness who have been wronged by the system to bring civil 
actions against the government and/or care providers. Possibilities for 
legislative reform, such as inserting a guarantee of the "least restrictive 
alternative" in relevant provincial statutes or passing a Patients' Bill of 
Rights, will also be canvassed in Part V. 
II. DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION, p AST AND PRESENT 
The traditional asylum system, favoured throughout the 19th century, 
became even more entrenched after the turn of the century. Mental 
hospitals had already grown considerably by the end of World War 
1 The term "aftercare" is used to denote a panoply of care and treatment services individuals 
may require after being discharged from hospital including: counseling, case management, 
vocational and skills training, substance abuse therapy, education, crisis management, help 
with daily living, etc .. 
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Two, when thousands of new beds were added to accommodate an 
influx of patients from the battlefields of Europe and Asia.2 Nine thou-
sand new psychiatric beds were introduced in Ontario alone during the 
period from 1932 and 1948.3 
While reliance on the system increased at a rapid pace, funding 
levels did not. Mental institutions quickly became overcrowded and 
patients suffered as a result - a fact that did not go unnoticed by social 
reformers and journalists of the day. In the United States, Albert 
Deutsch wrote about appalling conditions in mental hospitals in his 
book The Shame of the States.4 His sentiments were echoed by newsmen 
across the U.S., some of whom compared the mental wards of hospitals 
to Nazi concentration camps.5 
Criticism of the asylum approach also began to surface within the 
medical profession. Some, like Dr. Harry Solomon, President of the 
American Psychiatric Association, wondered aloud whether institutions 
that housed people with mental illness had not become "antiquated, 
outmoded and ... obsolete."6 Thanks to new and revolutionary psycho-
tropic medications, psychiatrists observed a new sense of calm prevail-
ing in mental wards. New medications also helped control many of the 
violent behaviours which made doctors reluctant to prescribe anything 
other than long-term confinement for patients with schizophrenia and 
severe mood disorders. 7 If medication could put to rest many of the 
"worst" symptoms of mental illness, psychiatrists hypothesized that 
even their most chronic patients would now be able to function in the 
community. With public administrators chafing at the high costs of 
maintaining and staffing psychiatric facilities, the pressure was on to get 
the "social experiment" underway. The deinstitutionalization move-
ment was born. 
2 See M. Drassinower & S. Levine, "More Sinned Against Than Sinning: Housing, Mental 
Illness and Disability" ( 1995) 6 Windsor Review of Legal and Social Issues 91 at 101-103 
[Drassinower & Levine, "Sinned"]. 
3 Ibid. at 102. 
4 Albert Deutsch, The Shame of the States (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1948). 
5 R.J. Issac & V.C. Armat, Madness in the Streets: How Psychiat1y and the Laiv Abandoned 
the Mentally fl/ (New York: The Free Press, 1990) at 68 [Issac & Armat]. 
6 Ibid. at 69, quoting from Dr. Solomon's 1958 presidential address to the American Psychiat-
ric Association. 
7 Chlorpromazine, thought to be a miracle drug for the treatment of schizophrenia, was first 
introduced in 1952. Issac & An11at, supra note 5 at 20. 
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1. Civil Rights and the Mentally Ill 
Thousands of anti-war and equality rights protesters took to the streets 
during the 1960s, seeking more accountability from government and an 
end to the tyranny of the majority. Many in the counter-culture saw the 
mentally ill as sharing in the same struggle. Calling mental illness a 
myth, civil libertarians argued that mental institutions were little more 
than holding bins for dissidents and others who threatened the existing 
power structure.8 They viewed psychiatry as a tool of oppression and 
called for mental hospitals to be shut down and its population set free. 
Although their strength in numbers was new, much of the rhetoric 
employed by civil libertarians was not. Over 100 years earlier, John 
Stuart Mill wrote that "the only purpose for which power can rightfully 
be exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his 
will, is to prevent harm to others."9 This message resonated with activ-
ists and also with prominent philosophers like Michael Foucault, who 
spoke out against the "moral imprisonment" brought on by institutional 
living. Io If mental illness was little more than an unorthodox way of 
seeing the world, and posed no threat except to the establishment itself, 
then the coercive power of the state could not be justified. 
The libertarian teachings of Mill also struck a chord with what R. J. 
Issac and V. C. Annat call the "anti-psychiatry" movement. I I Composed 
of renegade psychiatrists like R.D. Laing and Thomas Szasz, anti-
psychiatrists theorized that what other scientists considered a "brain 
disease" was better explained as a social phenomenon brought on by a 
host of familial, cultural, and socio-economic factors. Accordingly, 
"anti-psychiatrist" psychiatrists argued that locking individuals away in 
8 Issac & Armat, supra note 5 at 26-27. 
9 J.S. Mill, "On Liberty" in S. Collini, ed., On Liberty and Other Writings (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989) 8 at 13. Mill goes on to qualify that self-determination "is 
meant to apply only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties. We are not speaking of 
children or of young persons below the age which the law may fix as that of manhood or 
womanhood" (ibid.) This passage is sometimes cited by those who favour paternalistic 
interventions for the mentally ill. Like children, the argument goes, mentally disordered 
persons lack insight and the ability to make reasoned decisions about their own lives. This 
makes it necessary for the state to intervene. 
10 Issac & Armat, supra note 5 at 52, citing M. Foucault, Madness and Civilization: A Hist01y 
of Insanity in the Age of Reason (New York: Pantheon, 1965) at 247-248. 
11 Issac & Armat, supra note 5 at 19-64. 
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order to "rescue them from themselves" only served to perpetuate 
feelings of low self-esteem that caused psychic disturbances in the first 
place. This notion was also given credence by literary works of the day, 
most notably Ken Kesey's One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest. 
2. Legislative Action and Inaction 
Legislators were quick to respond to calls for deinstitutionalization, and 
the effects were immediate and long-lasting. For example, between 
1965 and 1975 the in-patient population at Hamilton (Ontario) Psychiat-
ric Hospital went from 1750 to 700. By 1995 only 211 in-patient beds 
remained. 12 Similar developments occurred across the country, includ-
ing at the Nova Scotia Hospital in Dartmouth, where beds have been 
reduced from over 1000 in the 1960s to only 186 today. 13 
In the United States, the federal government helped champion 
deinstitutionalization efforts. In 1963, during the Presidency of John F. 
Kennedy, Congress passed the Mental Retardation and Community 
Mental Health Centers Construction Act. 14 The centrepiece of the new 
legislation was federal funding for thousands of Community Mental 
Health Centers (CMHCs) where former in-patients could receive coun-
seling, vocational training and a variety of other services aimed at 
easing the transition from hospitalization to community living. 
Kennedy's plan envisioned the CMHCs assuming a dominant role in 
mental health care, making hospitalization, for all but the most chronic 
patients, a thing of the past. 15 Sure enough, state hospitals began to 
phase out beds as CMHCs were introduced. 16 
12 F. Vallance-Jones, "Left adrift in the community" The [Hamilton] Spectator (13 May 2000) 
Al3 [Vallance-Jones]. 
13 R. Bland & B. Dufton, Mental Health: A Time for Action (Province of Nova Scotia: 
Submitted to the Deputy Minister of Health, 2000) at 32 [Bland & Dufton]. 
14 42 U.S.C.A. § 2674 (1963). 
15 See Issac & Armat, supra note 5 at 77-81; J. Bach, "Requiring Due Care in the Process of 
Patient Deinstitutionalization: Toward a Common Approach to Mental Health Care Reform" 
(1989) The Yale Journal 1153 at 1155 [Bach, "Deinstitutionalization"]. 
16 For example, the average population at psychiatric hospitals in the state of Maryland 
declined from 7,114 to 1,200 between 1970 and 1997: Williams v. Wasserman 164 F. Supp. 
2d. 591 (D.Md. 2001). This trend was replicated across the country. The number of inpatient 
beds in state mental hospitals decreased from 559, 000 to 132, 000 between 1955 and 1980. 
See Bach, "Deinstitutionalization", ibid. at 1155-1156. 
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While regulators made good on their promise to close down mental 
hospitals, they were slow to provide the kind of support and case 
management former patients needed to adjust to their new surroundings. 
The pace of deinstitutionalization outstripped the development of new 
community-based resources. By 1970, consumer-rights groups in 
Ontario were already publicizing the fact that out-patient services were 
lacking in the province. 17 In the United States, fewer than 700 of the 
2,500 planned CMHCs had been built as of 1989. 18 By the end of the 
1980s, lawsuits had been launched in twenty-one states, demanding 
state governments provide more services for the mentally ill. 19 
3. The Aftermath of Deinstitutionalization 
Deinstitutionalization was premised on the notion that people with 
mental illness would be better served in the community than they had as 
shut-aways in psychiatric wards. Instead of psychiatrists and nurses, 
people with mental illness could take comfort in friends, neighbours, 
employers, social workers, and family doctors. Instead of enduring 
cramped and chaotic hospital living, newly liberated patients could live 
in their own apartment or semi-autonomously at a supervised care 
home. 
For many of those who have left institutions in the last forty years, 
however, deinstitutionalization has delivered much less than it prom-
ised. More often than not, the transition to community living has proved 
to be difficult, even disastrous. Instead of the welcoming anns of the 
community, many leaving mental institutions have found themselves 
increasingly shunned, isolated, and marginalized. The reality of the 
"outside" has, in fact, often proven to be more harsh than what many 
experienced in the institutional care system. According to consumer 
advocate Carol Tooton, the situation is so bleak for some people there is 
a temptation to romanticize their time in hospital where "at least I had a 
roof over my head and food in my stomach."20 
17 Drassinower & Levine, "Sinned", supra note 2 at I 05. 
18 Bach, "Deinstitutionalization", supra note 15atI156. 
19 Issac & Armat, supra note 5 at 309. 
20 Interview of Carol Tooton, Executive Director of Canadian Mental Health Association 
(CMHA), Halifax Branch (14 February 2002) by author [Tooton]. 
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One of the more visible by-products of deinstitutionalization gone 
wrong is homelessness. As Issac and Armat write of the American 
experience: "many of our modem institutions for the mentally ill exist in 
the open air: parks, alleys, vacant lots, steam grates on our city pave-
ments."21 The situation is no different in Canada. Recent studies esti-
mate that between 20-25% of individuals living on Canadian streets 
suffer from some form of mental illness.22 
Certainly not all formerly institutionalized patients have found 
themselves left in the lurch by an uncaring system. In Ontario alone 
there are 335 community-based mental health agencies providing a 
range of crisis management and treatment programs, as well as helping 
people with mental illness find shelter.23 Recognizing the appalling lack 
of affordable housing across Canada, the federal government pledged 
millions in December 1999 towards building new community-based 
homes for the mentally ill as part of its "Homeless Initiative."24 The 
Initiative has already benefited some previously left out in the cold. For 
example, with the assistance of nearly $1.4 million from the Govern-
ment of Canada, a new apartment building recently opened on 
Gottingen Street in Halifax, complete with independent quarters for 
eighteen individuals described as "difficult to house", and a live-in staff 
person available twenty-four hours a day. 
Still, it remains more common to find discharged psychiatric pa-
tients living in sub-standard boarding homes, eating rancid sardines, and 
getting little or no attention from psychiatrists (as Dr. Nancy Herman 
observed in her 1985 doctoral thesis), than living in comfortable apart-
ments like the units described above. 25 Wait lists are common for most 
21 Issac & Armat, supra note 5 at I. Studies estimate that 20-25% of homeless people in 
America have a "serious mental illness." Online: National Resource Center on Homelessness 
and Mental Illness <http://www.nrchmi.com> (date accessed: 23 March 2002). 
22 Online: CBC Frontline <http://www.tv.cbc.ca/witness/mental/mentalhome.htm> (date ac-
cessed: 23 March 2002). 
23 Vallance-Jones, supra note 12 at Al3. 
24 Human Resources and Development Canada, News Release 01-09, "New Housing Facility 
in Halifax to receive funding" (12 March 2001). Of the $753 million devoted to the Homeless 
Initiative, $305 million was designated for the Supporting Communities Partnership Initiative 
(SCPI), a plan to "develop local solutions to ... the homeless challenges (of local communities) 
and establish a seamless web of supports for the homeless population." 
25 Vallance-Jones, supra note 12 at A13. See also P. Capponi, "Legal issues in psychiatric 
boarding homes" (1986) 4 Just Cause No. I at 18. 
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placements and programs in Nova Scotia.26 Where there are available 
spots, patients are often at the mercy of care facility administrators who 
get to "pick-and-choose" the residents. 27 This sort of discrimination is 
actually facilitated by the Homes for Special Care Act, which gives 
maximum discretion to administrators to determine who is suitable.28 
The frustration of being stigmatized as unmanageable or dangerous 
by a care home operator, living in slum-like conditions, or spending 
your days in a cardboard home beneath the Gardiner Expressway in 
Toronto,29 is palpable to anyone who has ever met a mentally ill person 
in these circumstances. Sometimes this frustration manifests in self-
de structi ve behaviour. Unfortunately, this is the side of 
deinstitutionalization best known to the general public, propagated 
through splashy headlines about discharged patients throwing them-
selves in front of subways and wandering aimlessly through the 
streets.3° Contrariwise, the general public does not often hear about 
individuals who have adjusted well, become consumer advocates, or 
staited their own business, for example.31 
The sense of despair engendered by years of being ignored and 
marginalized has also driven some ex-psychiatric patients to extreme 
acts of violence. Some of these cases have been high profile and have 
prompted criticism of deillstitutionalization policies. In 1985 a public 
outcry resulted when fonner psychiatric patient Andrew Leyston-
Hughes murdered 23-year-old heiress Nancy Eaton.32 Concern was 
similarly widespread in 1995 after Jeffrey Arenburg shot Ottawa sports-
caster Brian Smith while suffering from paranoid delusions. 33 
26 Interview of Pam Townsend, A. Supervisor at the Department of Community Services, 
Community Supports for Adults Division (15 March 2002) by author [Townsend]. 
27 Bland & Dufton, supra note 13 at 18. 
28 N.S. Reg. 73/93, s. 15(5). According to s. 13, the Minister "may" appoint a committee to 
review admission decisions if there is a dispute over what level of care is appropriate for a 
given individual. 
29 These observations are based on my experiences in Toronto as a volunteer at the Queen 
Street Mental Health Centre in 1998-1999 and as a low income advocate at the Daily Bread 
Food Bank in 2000. 
30 Issac & A1mat, supra note 5 at 157. 
31 For a list of"Psychiatric Survivor Economic Initiatives" in Ontario see online: The Ontario 
Council for Alternative Businesses <http://www.icomm.ca/ocab/psced.htm> (date accessed: 
17 April 2002). 
32 K. Harris, "Delicate Balancing Act; Ontario Review Board Weighs Rights to Freedom, 
Safety" The [Ottawa] Sun (8 July 2001) 8. 
33 K. Harris, "Troubled Road to Tragic Act; The warning signs of a desperately sick man were 
there, yet Arenburg remained untreated" The [Ottawa] Sun (31 May 2001) 4. 
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In the wake of Smith's death, debate intensified over when and how 
psychiatric patients with violent pasts should be released into the com-
munity. In response, the Ontario government amended the Health Care 
Act to allow psychiatrists to issue Community Treatment Orders (CTOs) 
for individuals who have been hospitalized on more than one occasion 
after being released what some call the revolving door syndrome.34 
Known as "Brian's Law" the amendments make it possible for police to 
take someone into custody if they fail to comply with a treatment 
order.35 
While answering the need for greater supervision of individuals 
released from the hospital, the new amendments did not address many of 
the root causes of the "revolving door" syndrome; such as, failing 
community supports, a lack of early intervention, and little or no afford-
able housing. In fact, in some ways, CTOs stand in the way of healthy 
community treatment. According to a Position Paper by the Ontario 
Division of the Canadian Mental Health Association (CMHA), impos-
ing a treatment order without the patient's consent "diminishes trust and 
true cooperation between caregiver and patient and may be a deterrent to 
the fonnation of a therapeutic relationship" because of the debilitating 
side effects of many medications.36 Still, when CTOs and leave certifi-
cates37 are issued in conjunction with a plan to utilize community 
supports, they have proven to be a positive step in the lives of patients.38 
III. Do DISABLED INDIVIDUALS HAVE A RIGHT TO 
COMMUNITY-BASED CARE? 
The failure of provincial governments to deliver on community care 
begs the question of whether the right to community-based care exists at 
34 Mental Health Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7, as am. by S.O. 2000 c. 9. Repeat hospitalization 
must occur within a three-year span to a CTO to be issued. 
35 Ibid. at s. 33.3(3). 
36 Canadian Mental Health Association, Position Paper Regarding the Use of Community 
Treatment Orders for Persons with Mental Illness by the Public Policy Committee (Ontario 
Division, 1998) at 3. 
37 Unlike CTO's, leave certificates are issued only with the patient's consent. Currently, five 
provinces and one territory have leave provisions within their mental health legislation. 
38 J. Gray, M. A. Shone & P. Liddle, Canadian Mental Health Law Policy (Toronto: 
Butterworths, 2000) at 221-223 [Gray, Shone & Liddle]. 
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all, or whether this is merely a "political" question which the courts 
should not address. In this respect, the experience of physically disabled 
claimants who have sought additional rights and entitlements through 
the courts is instructive. This part considers whether people with mental 
illness have a "right" to comprehensive aftercare, or at least a right to 
treatment on par with that offered to others, and whether sections 7 and 
15 of the Charter can be relied on to assert these rights. In order to 
contrast the largely unsuccessful experience of disabled Canadian 
claimants, this part will also look at the right-based approach of Ameri-
can courts. 
1. Section 15 Jurisprudence 
Efforts to secure a greater commitment by the government vis-a-vis 
community care and programming might be pursued by way of Charter 
challenges. A claim that mental health consumers are being underserved 
by existing aftercare treatment programs, for example, could be sup-
ported by s. 15 of the Charter, which states that: 
( 1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the 
right to equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimi-
nation and, in particular, without discrimination based on ... mental or 
physical disability. 
(2) Subsection (I) does not preclude any law, program, or activity 
that has as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged 
individuals or groups including those who are disadvantaged because 
of. .. mental or physical disability.39 
In order to lodge a successful s. 15 claim, the mental health claimant 
would have to demonstrate that she is being denied "equal benefit of the 
law" as a result of her mental disability. Since discriminatory treatment 
is judged through a comparative approach, it would be necessary to 
contrast the experience of mentally ill persons with that of another 
"similarly situated" group.40 The relevant comparator group would 
39 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 15, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [Charter]. 
40 See Law v. Canada (iVfinister of Employment and Immigration) [1999] S.C.J. No. 12 
(S.C.C.), (QL) [Law]. 
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likely be people with physical disabilities who are also in the position of 
requiring aftercare upon release from hospital. Where public housing 
and/or social assistance is concerned, the relevant comparator would be 
all others entitled to the benefit.41 
In Nova Scotia in particular, some consumer advocates make the 
claim that individuals with physical disabilities have better access to 
aftercare programs and services than individuals with mental illness, 
although there is little quantitative evidence to back this up. For ex-
ample, in his report on the Nova Scotia Community Based Options 
system of housing, Dr. Michael Kendrick notes a "net preference and 
priority in terms of people who get served" for individuals with intellec-
tual or physical impairments.42 This imbalance is also evident in voca-
tional and skills-training programs which are better equipped to assist 
those with physical disabilities, although enrollment is often higher 
among the mentally ill.43 
Still, using s. 15 to demand services on par with individuals who are 
physically disabled would be an uphill climb for mental health consum-
ers. To succeed, differences in treatment would have to be tied directly 
to the functional values of the legislation. If the differential treatment 
reflects a stereotype about mentally ill persons or promotes the view that 
these individuals are less worthy of respect or dignity a Charter remedy 
may be granted, but otherwise the court will not "second guess policy 
decisions. "44 
11 See e.g. Alcoholism Foundation v. Winnipeg [1990] M.J. No. 212 (M.C.A.) (QL), where a 
by-law making it illegal to build two group homes within a hundred metres of each other 
was found unconstitutional. 
12 M. Kendrick, An Independent Evaluation of the Nova Scotia Community Based Options 
Community Residential Service System (Province of Nova Scotia: Prepared for the Nova 
Scotia Department of Community Services) at 153 [Kendrick]. Dr. Kendrick goes on to say 
:hat "[i]t was not possible for this evaluator to statistically verify this possibility though such 
m exercise would be useful." 
u Tooton gives the example of Nova Scotia's Employability Assistance for People with 
Disabilities Initiative (EAPD) program which helps persons with disabilities accomplish 
;econdary education. Although the majority of people in the program have mental health 
.ssues, Tooton notes that only one expert on staff specializes in this area. "When is the light 
;;oing to go on?," she says. 
14 Per Iacobucci J.: "human dignity is harmed when individuals and groups are marginalized, 
.gnored, or devalued, and is enhanced when laws recognize the full place of all individuals and 
;;roups within Canadian society." Law, supra note 40. See also Law Society British Columbia 
v. Andrews [1989] S.C.J. No. 6 at para. 65 (S.C.C.), (QL). 
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Recent s. 15 jurisprudence on the rights of physically disabled 
claimants demonstrates the pitfalls of using the Charter to challenge 
administrative decision-making with respect to aftercare. In the vast 
majority of these cases, the court has paid deference to ministerial 
judgment in allocating funds and developing service priorities. As long 
as discretion is exercised in a reasonable, non-capricious manner, the 
director or administrator of a social assistance plan,45 extended care 
programme,46 or nursing home47 will escape Charter scrutiny. 
Budget considerations are also given significant weight by the court. 
Canadian courts have consistently held that limited resources will ex-
cuse the government from accommodating everyone or accommodating 
everyone to the extent they would like.48 This was the case in Fernandes 
v. Manitoba (Director of Social Services) where the Court held that it 
was not discriminatory to withhold funding for the severely disabled 
plaintiff to hire an expensive home care attendant, even though it meant 
an extended hospital stay for an individual who qualified for a govern-
ment-sponsored program which would have enabled him to live in the 
community. Fernandes is one in a long line of cases where the Court has 
taken a hands-off approach where "political" decision-making and 
choices that "affect the public purse" are on the table.49 
Another possibility for mental health consumers would be to follow 
the Eldridge line of cases and argue that, although most aftercare 
programs do not purposely exclude the mentally ill, the manner in which 
these services are carried out has the effect of discriminating against 
people with mental health issues.50 As Laforest J. notes in Eldridge: 
"the government will rarely single out disabled persons for discrimina-
45 See Conradv. Halifax (County) [1993] N.S.J. No. 342 (N.S.S.C.) (QL) [Conrad]. 
46 See R.R. v. Alberta (Child Welfare Appeal Panel) [2000] A.J. No. 580 (A.Q.B.) (QL) [R.R.]. 
47 See Ontario Nursing Home Association v. Ontario (HCJ) [1990] 0.J. No. 2042 (O.H.C.J.) 
(QL). 
48 See e.g. Lovelace v. Ontario [2000] S.C.J. No. 36 (S.C.C.) (QL). 
49 ( 1992), 78 Man. R. (2d) 172 [Fernandes]. See also Law, supra note 40; Lovelace, ibid. note 
48; Miron v. Trudel [1995] S.C.J. No. 44 (S.C.C.) (QL); Compare Egan v. Canada [1995] 2 
S.C.R. 513. 
50 So-called "adverse effect" discrimination has been recognized by the Court in a number of s. 
15 Charter challenges. See e.g. Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General}, [1997] S.C.J. 
No. 86 (S.C.C.) (QL) [Eldridge]; Eaton v. Brant County Board of Education, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 
241; Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493. 
14 - DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 
tory treatment."51 More common is when the state offers a benefit, but 
does so in an under-inclusive way. This is the case when a program 
purports to help all adults with disabilities, but dedicates more resources 
to one group then another. 52 
A challenge along these lines would be possible, but may prove 
difficult and costly to litigate. Even if differential treatment could be 
shown, the claimant would still have to establish that discrimination is at 
the source of the distinction and that the benefit in question is "essen-
tial" and not merely "ancillary" to the right. 53 The problem is, of course, 
that few Canadian jurisdictions consider aftercare to be an essential 
service. This is reflected in the low priority given to community sup-
ports for adults and the fact few provinces make the legislative guaran-
tee of the "least restrictive altemative".54 Accordingly, falling short in 
the provision of aftercare services would not engage section 15 in the 
same way it did in Eldridge, where access to medical care itself was at 
issue. 
2. No Affirmative Right to Community Care 
Unlike their American counterparts, Canadians with mental and physi-
cal disabilities do not have an affirmative right to receive support from 
the community so they can live independently or at least semi-autono-
mously. In fact, it is debatable whether informal patients have the right 
to treatment at all. Some claimants have suggested that not having the 
option of less restrictive care deprives them of "security of the person" 
and thus violates s. 7 of the Charter. The section reads as follows: 
(7) Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person 
and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the 
principles of fundamental justice.55 
51 Eldridge, ibid. at para. 64. 
52 The EAPD program mentioned in note 43 is a prime example. 
53 Eldridge, supra note 50 at para. 71. The Court held that being able to communicate with 
doctor is essential to getting medical treatment, and thus sign language translators do not 
amount to an "ancillary" service. 
54 This is discussed at length in part three - Nova Scotia as a Case Study. 
55 Charter, supra note 39 at s. 7. 
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Unfortunately, the vast majority of these claims have failed, largely 
because of the Supreme Court's conservative stance on s. 7 rights. In the 
monumental decision of Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (A.G.), the Court 
made it clear that s. 7 does not include property rights or rights of a 
purely economic nature.56 While there are some exceptions, they are 
extremely limited. For example, the Court has held that a person's right 
to "psychological integrity" (which is included in the s. 7 guarantee) 
may have an economic component, but this aspect cannot be dominant. 57 
The Court's rigid position makes it highly unlikely that an indi-
vidual with mental illness would be able to rely on s. 7 to asse1t a right to 
community care, and recent s. 7 claims brought by physically disabled 
claimants have done nothing to suggest otherwise. If the court in those 
cases was not convinced that entitlements like social assistance,58 home 
nursing,59 and summer camp for children with cerebral palsy60 were 
anything other than pure "economic rights," it is unlikely similar claims 
by mentally ill individuals would be viewed any differently. While the 
Charter is able to provide "freedom from" discrimination that affronts 
the dignity of individuals; it is less likely to guarantee "freedom to" a 
range of entitlements which might improve the lives of these same 
individuals. 
3. The American Experience 
The situation for claimants is more prom1smg in the United States, 
largely because of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) which 
became law in 1990, and the "due process" clause of the Constitution. 61 
Similar to our section 15, Title II of the ADA proscribes that no qualified 
individual with a disability be denied benefits and services "by reason of 
56 [1989] S.C.J. No. 36 (S.C.C.) (QL). 
57 Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(J)(c) of the Criminal Code (Man.), [1990] S.C.J. No. 52 at 
para 57 (S.C.C.) (QL). In this case, Lamer J. makes a distinction between the right to work, 
which is strictly economic, and the right to pursue a livelihood which has non-economic 
aspects. 
58 Conrad, supra note 45 at para. 70. 
59 Fernandes, supra note 49. 
60 R.R., supra note 46. 
61 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U .S.C.A. § 12101 ( 1990). 
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such disability."62 The ADA, however, goes beyond the "freedom from" 
justice offered by the Charter, mandating that all "public 
entit(ies) ... administer services, programs, and activities in the most 
integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with 
disabilities. "63 
The ADA makes treatment in the least restrictive manner a right, 
albeit one subject to limitations. According to Olmstead v. L. C., the U.S. 
Supreme Court's authoritative interpretation of section 35.130 (the so-
called "integration regulation"), states are required to provide commu-
nity-based resources when: 
(a) The State's treatment professionals determine placement to be 
appropriate; 
(b) The affected persons do not oppose such treatment; 
( c) Placement can be reasonably accommodated taking into account 
the resources to the State and the needs of others with mental 
disabilities.64 
If each of these criteria are met, the State is required to accommodate the 
disabled person in "a setting that enables (the) individual... to interact 
with non-disabled persons to the fullest extent possible."65 
Of the three Olmstead requirements, the third poses the greatest 
obstacle to claimants. Budgetary constraints, however, may relieve the 
State of its duty to accommodate the plaintiff only temporarily. Once the 
State can fulfill its obligations to the claimant without sacrificing the 
interests of other mentally disabled persons, it must proceed with the 
placement.66 In the meantime, the State is expected to demonstrate that it 
has an "effect(ive) working plan" and a "waiting list that (moves) at a 
reasonable pace."67 This is a far cry from s. 15 Charter jurispmdence, 
where virtually any claim pertaining to underinclusive legislation can be 
tmmped by the government playing the financial stringency card. 
Determining whether or not the State has the funds to make good on 
reintegration efforts involves a delicate calculus. Rather than looking at 
62 Ibid. at §12132. 
63 Code of Federal Regulations 28 C.F.R. §35.130 (1990). 
64 Olmstead v. L. C., 119 S. Ct. 2180 (1999) [Olmstead]. 
65 Ibid. at 2185 
66 Ibid. at 2189. 
67 Ibid. 
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only how much it would cost to reintegrate the claimant, the court will 
consider the expense of modifying the State's programs to accommo-
date others who fit into the same category. If "the requested modifica-
tion would cause a 'fundamental alteration' of a state's services and 
programs," the State will be able to justify the delay in placement.68 
Justice Ginsburg refers to this as the State's "affirmative defense."69 
IV. NOVA SCOTIA AS A CASE STUDY 
Despite a long-standing commitment to using community programs to 
assist and rehabilitate Nova Scotians with mental illness, complaints 
that many of these individuals are falling through the cracks are as 
pervasive as ever. In May 2000, Dr. Roger Bland and Dr. Brian Dufton 
released Mental Health: A Time for Action, a detailed report prepared on 
behalf of Nova Scotia's Department of Health (DoH).7° Considering the 
no less than thi1ty-six white papers and studies that came before it, the 
report was aptly named: "[T]he title of the report captures a strong 
theme ... that it is high time to take action and that there has been enough 
talk and more than enough analysis of problems."71 
Bland and Dufton found a system that is in many places 
underfunded, poorly organized, and out of touch with the mental health 
consumer. Due to the split jurisdiction between the Department of 
Health (which handles psychiatric in-patient care and treatment) and the 
Department of Community Services (which handles aftercare services 
like housing and welfare), there is a sense of fragmentation which can be 
dizzying to the consumer. With few legislative guarantees in place, 
Nova Scotians with mental illness have had to rely mainly on political 
pressure and activism to encourage the government to address short-
comings in the system. As one might expect, this has been a slow and 
grueling process. While some have found supportive community hous-
ing, effective counseling services, and long-tenn treatment programs, 
68 Ibid. at 2188. 
69 Ibid. note 64. 
70 Bland & DuJlon, supra note 13. 
71 Bland & Dufton, supra note 13 at 5. 
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many others have been neglected, lost in the shuffle, and left to fend for 
themselves. 
1. Few Legislative Guarantees 
Nova Scotians with a mental illness who have been discharged from the 
hospital face an uncertain future. While there are programs to ease the 
transition from hospital to community living, there are few statutory 
assurances where aftercare services are concerned. For those committed 
as involuntary patients under the Hospitals Act, there is no promise of 
the "least restrictive alternative" and no guarantee of treatment consis-
tent with mental health "best practices".72 
The Hospitals Act provides for methods of discharge but is silent on 
what happens to the patient following release. 73 Once a review board 
determines that a patient should not continue to be detained: "the facility 
shall take such action as is required to give effect to such determination" 
or the patient may remain as an informal patient,74 subject to the written 
consent of a qualified medical practitioner.75 Presumably, the actions 
required to effect release are something more than a handshake and a 
shove in the right direction, but neither the Hospitals Act nor the 
Regulations enacted pursuant to the Act elaborate on this. 
Once returned to the community, discharged patients will in many 
cases receive income support pursuant to the Employment Support and 
Income Assistance Act (ESIAA}. 76 Under the ESIAA, benefits for indi-
viduals with disabilities are calculated on the same scale as "nonnal" 
adults, with additional funds for medication and other special needs. 
Individuals who qualify for housing assistance through the Department 
of Community Services (DoCS) may be placed in a licensed group 
home or small option home, depending on availability. Many care 
72 Hospitals Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 208. For admission procedures, see sections 34-36 in 
particular. 
73 Ibid. at ss. 47, 63-65. 
74 Ibid. at s. 68 
75 Ibid. at s. 34(4) 
76 Employment Support and Income Assistance Act, R.S.N.S. 2000, c. 27. 
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homes in Nova Scotia are administered under the Homes for Special 
Care Act, which provides for licensing procedures and basic care stan-
dards. 77 
2. Mental Health Programs and Policies 
i. Housing and Residential Care 
Before an individual can receive a housing placement, they must first be 
approved by the Community Supports for Adults section of the DoCS. 
This involves a lengthy classification process which Bland and Dufton 
call "cumbersome and antiquated."78 The potential recipient is expected 
to disclose current financial information as well as undergo a twelve-
page psychosocial assessment. 79 
Based on the results of the assessment, a case worker determines 
whether the individual qualifies for placement. If so, they are assigned 
to an appropriate care home. The process, however, is a lot less scien-
tific than it might appear. Since there are long wait lists for virtually all 
placements and programs, the matching process usually comes down to 
"not what's the best option, but what's available," in the words of one 
DoCS case worker.80 As a result, consumers often find themselves in 
large, institutional-seeming residences which are unable to meet their 
individualized needs, forced to live with other people who have been 
stamped with the "same label."81 
Funding for licensed group home and long-term residential care 
homes is provided on a per diem basis,82 meaning there is constant 
pressure to fill beds as soon as they become available. This encourages 
home operators to accept individuals blindly, regardless of whether their 
residence would make a good "fit". Those unhappy with their placement 
77 N.S. Reg. 73/93, ss. 29-55. 
78 Bland & Dufton, supra note 13 at 16. 
79 Townsend, supra note 26. Examples of typical questions asked: "can you dress yourself' 
and "can you do your own toileting"? 
80 Townsend, supra note 26. 
81 Kendrick, supra note 42 at 85-87. 
82 "Per diem" refers to the set amount the care home receives from the DoCS for each 
additional resident. 
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or unwilling to live in a "highly structured" group home setting83 can 
choose instead to find their own accommodations. More often than not, 
this can mean living in a slum-like apartment, boarding home, or worse 
still - on the streets. 
ii. Treatment 
Studies indicate that continuity of treatment can vastly improve chances 
of successfully reintegrating into the community following release.84 
For mental health consumers in Nova Scotia, aftercare treatment is 
available on a variety of fronts. The DoH offers adult out-patient pro-
grams which include drug dependency programs, while the DoCS offers 
emergency services and legal services. Help is also available from non-
profit agencies like the Canadian Mental Health Association, which 
offer advocacy and skills training. 
Although outreach programs such as the "Clubhouse" network run 
by the Department of Health tend to be comprehensive and well-run, 
there are not enough of these programs to meet the need, especially in 
rural areas. 85 Especially lacking are assertive community treatment pro-
grams, to ensure that discharged patients continue to take their medica-
tion and meet their recovery schedule.86 
Without an adequate system of case management, it is common for 
psychiatrists and nursing staff to "lose touch" with a patient once they 
leave the hospital. The problem is compounded by the "split jurisdic-
tion" between Health and Community Services. In the event an indi-
vidual is forced to return to hospital, their file will be passed back to the 
DoH, only to be passed back again to the DoCS upon discharge. This 
elaborate game of departmental "hot potato" only serves to confuse 
patients and disrupt recovery efforts. 
83 Tooton, supra note 20. While some find the regimen imposed by many group homes to be 
"comforting" others find these arrangements to be overly paternalistic and at times disrespect-
ful. At some care homes, for example, residents are asked to leave in the morning and are not 
allowed to return until 5 pm. 
84 H. Branswell, "Patients benefit from continuity of care, researchers show readmittance less 
likely with access to discharge records" The [Halifax] Chronicle-Herald (2 March 2002) A9. 
85 Bland & Dufton, supra note 13 at 20. 
86 Bland & Dufton, supra note 13 at 16. 
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iii. Reintegration 
As Justice Ginsburg suggests in Olmstead, the most "integrated setting" 
is one where there is ample opportunity to interact with non-disabled 
individuals. Unfortunately, this is often not possible in Nova Scotia 
where highly structured, congregate settings are the norm and smaller, 
more personalized options are increasingly scarce. As Kendrick sug-
gests in his report on Community Based Options87 (CBOs), the province 
has gone from being a leader in the field and emphasizing CBOs, to 
shelving many of these efforts in favour of group homes and long-term 
care facilities. 88 
The lack of CBOs creates a ripple effect throughout the system: 
individuals in group homes have to wait for a more integrated place-
ment, individuals in hospital have to wait for a space to open in a group 
home, and individuals in the criminal justice system deemed not crimi-
nally responsible (NCR) have to wait in jail89 until a psychiatric bed 
becomes available. For psychiatric patients and NCR offenders espe-
cially, the waiting game can entail a significant loss of freedom. NCR 
offenders spend their time behind bars, while psychiatric patients are 
forced to remain in acute units or are placed under adult protection until 
a community placement becomes available.90 This is unpleasant and can 
further stigmatize an individual as "crazy'', making it even more diffi-
cult to gain acceptance in the mainstream. 
The DoH established the "Clubhouse" system to help ease the 
transition process and foster a sense of belonging and community often 
missing in large, impersonal residences. At the Connections Clubhouse 
in Halifax for example, members can sign up for a job placement 
service, get computer training, buy second-hand clothes, find an apart-
87 This term refers to housing arrangements where two or three disabled individuals live 
together, sometimes with a supervisor or non-disabled person(s) as well. CBO's are often 
unlicensed and sometimes nothing more than a room rented out in a family home. Small group 
homes, supported apartments, adult shared living, and adult family care are all examples of 
CBO's. 
88 Kendrick, supra note 42 at 14, 51-52. 
89 This has become increasingly rare since a new forensic psychiatric hospital opened near 
Halifax in October 200 I. 
90 Bland & Dufton, supra note 13 at 17. Pam Townsend says people waiting to be discharged 
may be given priority over individuals outside the formal system awaiting placement but 
only if the person is considered "high risk". 
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ment, as well as socialize with friends in the common room or barbecue 
on the back deck. Being able to drop in for support and friendship makes 
facing life post-discharge more manageable and imbues a sense of hope. 
As one member puts it, "this is the place people go to find out they can 
do something."91 
3. Restructuring Efforts 
Health system reform has been on the government agenda for nearly a 
decade, but mental health services in Nova Scotia have changed very 
little during this time. In 1994, the Blueprint for Health System Reform 
recommended that significant changes be made to the way health ser-
vices are administered in the province, noting "our health system needs 
substantial renovations, not just minor changes."92 
i. Community Support Model 
Among suggestions for improving mental health services in the prov-
ince, the Blueprint Committee recommended adopting the "Community 
Support Model". The Model stresses a collaborative approach to plan-
ning and implementing care initiatives, with maximum flexibility to 
accommodate the needs of individual consumers.93 
The government responded to the Blueprint by completely over-
hauling the administrative structure of health care in the province. 
Responsibility for planning and implementing health services was 
placed in the hands of nine District Health Authorities (DHAs), with a 
network of Community Health Boards (CHBs) at the ground level. This 
helped make the system more responsive to the needs of particular 
regions and freed up resources in the provincial capital to focus on high 
level planning. 
91 Interview of "Leanne" and "Patrick", Clubhouse members, (1 March 2002) by author. 
92 Nova Scotia, Blueprint for Health System Reform (Blueprint Committee, 1994) (Chair: D.R. 
MacLean) at 8 [Blueprint]. 
93 Ibid. at 32. 
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Unfortunately, the new structure has not had much effect on the lives 
of Nova Scotians with mental illness, nor has it brought the province any 
closer to achieving the Community Support Model. In fact, Tooton 
suggests we are not even "1 %"towards recognizing this goal.94 In 2000, 
Bland and Dufton called on the province to make good on their pledge to 
bring the Community Support Model to life in Nova Scotia.95 
The reality is that institutionalization and rehabilitation, rather than 
community-based treatment, continue to be the primary focus of the 
Department of Health. Despite calls to enlarge the role of infonnal 
caregivers such as friends, family, and neighbours, the government has 
not introduced mechanisms or incentives to make this happen. 96 Sug-
gestions by the Blueprint Committee to establish a tax credit system for 
those who care for loved ones in the home, and to provide service 
allowances so that families can afford to hire a trained attendant, for 
example, have yet to materialize.97 
There continues to be a feeling that consumers do not have a voice in 
the process of designing and implementing mental health care. The 
introduction of CHBs has helped because there tends to be grassroots 
support for mental health initiatives at this level.98 Still, the consumer 
perspective can only truly be taken into account when it comes straight 
from the consumer/survivor. There have been few concerted efforts to 
make sure this happens.99 Without the input of survivors who can attest 
to the need for community-based care, many of these initiatives are 
doomed to fall victim to cost-cutting bureaucrats. 
ii. Funding 
Limited funding continues to stand in the way of new initiatives. Of the 
$626 million designated for the DoCS in the 2001-2002 Budget esti-
mates, $124 million was supposed to go towards "community supports 
94 Tooton, supra at note 20. 
95,Bland & Dufton, supra note 13 at 16. 
96 See Blueprint, supra note 92 at 35; Kendrick, supra note 42 at 49-52. 
97 Blueprint, supra note 92 at 37. 
98 Bland & Dufton, supra note 13 at 24. 
99 Tooton notes that on one committee assembled to look at consumer-led initiatives, fewer 
than 50% of committee members are consumers! 
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for adults". 100 These numbers are roughly in line with spending over the 
last few years. 
Kendrick suggests that significant cost savings could be achieved by 
diverting more money to CBOs instead of into residentializing people, 
which he considers an unsustainable practice. 101 The DoCS insists this is 
already happening. One case worker told me that "all of our gross has 
been in the smaller settings," with the real problem being "there are not 
enough resources to go around." 102 
To make better use of existing funds, the Blueprint suggests inte-
grating all sources of provincial funding for mental health services into a 
single envelope to be administered by the CHBs. 103 Bland and Dufton 
disagree, contending that segregating mental health from other health 
care services would produce a shortfall because money would inevitably 
gravitate to more "glamorous" health care priorities. 104 Regardless of 
which option is preferable, only a shift in spending priorities will 
accomplish what aftercare services in the province need most - a fresh 
infusion of funds. 
iii. Continuity, Coordination and Cooperation 
Psychiatric in-patients discharged in Halifax hospitals are more likely to 
receive effective aftercare treatment today than they would have five 
years ago, thanks to recent hospital-led initiatives. The "Share Care" 
program run by Queen Elizabeth II Hospital (QEII) in downtown 
Halifax is a prime example. Working in association with general practi-
tioners and social workers from the Connections Clubhouse, QEII psy-
chiatric nurses visit local shelters to monitor progress and distribute 
medications where necessary. 105 This prevents discharged patients from 
"losing touch" with the formal system. Greater continuity of care in tum 
100 Nova Scotia, Estimates for the fiscal year 2001-2002 (Nova Scotia: Department of Finance, 
2001) (The Hon. N.J. LeBlanc, Minister of Finance). 
101 Kendrick, supra note 42 at 49-52. 
102 Townsend, supra note 26. 
103 Blueprint, supra note 92 at 34. 
104 Bland & Dufton, supra note 13 at 22-24. 
105 Tooton, supra note 20. 
EXODUS: ... 25 
helps prevent "revolving door" syndrome and tragic stories like that of 
Jeffrey Arenburg. 
The drawback of Share Care, like many programs of this type, is that 
it only serves those classified as having a "severe and persistent mental 
disorder," while leaving less chronic patients without much assis-
tance. 106 To be sure, there are many concerned hospital staff who go out 
of their way to help patients chart the next steps on the road to reintegra-
tion. This sort of assistance, however, is not mandated by the DoH - it is 
strictly voluntary. The unfortunate reality, says housing expert Carol 
Evans, is that clinicians reach out to staff at agencies like the Metro 
Community Housing Association "only if they have the will" to do so. 107 
A lack of coordination between the DoH and the DoCS serves as a 
further obstacle for mental health consumers. Despite criticism of frag-
mentation brought on by Nova Scotia's split jurisdiction for mental 
health services, there have been few attempts to make the system more 
seamless. Kendrick's suggestion of administering treatment and after-
care within a single Mental Health Commission has gone ignored by all 
but consumer advocates. 108 As a result, discharged patients have to cope 
with needless bureaucracy and the run-around of dealing with several 
different offices. Few know this better than individuals who have re-
turned to hospital after time in the community. Once hospitalized for 
more than thirty days, a patient ceases to be the responsibility of the 
DoCS, meaning the individual's housing placement is lost. Even upon 
leaving the hospital the discharged patient cannot pick up where they 
left off - the DoCS requires that they be reclassified and sends them to 
the back of the line for a residential placement. 
V. POSSIBILITIES FOR REDRESS 
There are several avenues open to mental health consumers who feel 
they are not being adequately served by the present system. Where an 
106 Tooton, supra note 20. 
107 Interview of Carol Evans, Executive Director of the Metro Community Housing Associa-
tion in Halifax (27 February 2002) by author [Evans]. 
108 Kendrick, supra note 42 at 156. 
26 - DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 
administrative decision is the source of the problem, an individual can 
appeal to a provincial ombudsman and ask for relief directly from the 
government. 109 There is also the possibility of taking "matters into one's 
own hands" by pursuing litigation. This option might appeal to an 
individual who has been hospitalized past the date of being cleared to 
leave, or to someone who has been discharged but has floundered in 
their new surroundings - both situations arising due to a lack of commu-
nity placements and supports. 
While successful tort actions may spur on legislators wary of future 
lawsuits, statutory reform provides a more direct route to increasing the 
level of community-based supports. Two possible refonns are explored 
here: amending mental health legislation across the country to include a 
promise of the "least restrictive alternative", and fleshing out this guar-
antee through a "Patients' Bill of Rights" for individuals with disabili-
ties. The notion of achieving both through Comprehensive Mental 
Health Legislation (CMHL) will also be examined. 
1. Civil Actions 
There are at least three possible scenarios in which a disgruntled psychi-
atric in-patient or former in-patient might bring a civil action. The first 
scenario involves a standard "medical malpractice" claim, arising from 
negligent treatment on the part of a psychiatrist or other care profes-
sional. Since this scenario does not speak to the issue of community-
based care it will not be explored further. 
The second scenario is a variation on the first. Here, the psychiatric 
in-patient has been cleared to leave the hospital but cannot do so 
because of financial constraints, either his own or the department re-
sponsible for community placements. Adducing evidence about the 
deleterious effects of institutional confinement, the would-be plaintiff 
contends that he has been harmed by a course of treatment not suited to 
his needs, and that the government or hospital's failure to provide a less 
restrictive option amounts to negligence. This was essentially the 
109 Gray, Shone & Liddle, supra note 38 at 59. Where the individual is being discriminated 
against in the provision of private services and/or accommodation, they might also bring a 
complaint pursuant to relevant provincial Human Rights legislation. 
EXODUS: ... 27 
appellant's pos1t1on in Fernandes, although that case was framed in 
constitutional tenns. 110 
There have been few attempts in Canada to seek damages where 
hospitalization has can-ied on for too long, although claims of this sort 
have been brought in the United States. 111 The reason is that few 
Canadian courts acknowledge the "least restrictive alternative" as the 
standard of care owed to psychiatric in-patients. This might change if 
the "least restrictive alternative" was given expression in provincial 
mental health statutes, or in separate legislation dealing with patients' 
rights. Both these possibilities will be discussed in the next section. 
Should "over-hospitalization" claims become viable, it may be ad-
vantageous, where legislation permits, for several plaintiffs to raise their 
grievances together in a class action suit. 112 If one person is denied a 
placement in the community owing to limited social service resources, it 
is likely that others are similarly affected. Lynn Pierce argues in favour 
of the class action route, noting that "strength in numbers" is especially 
important for mentally ill claimants who may lack the financial re-
sources to bring a challenge on their own. 113 Class actions would also 
make sense for mental health consumers because the awareness gener-
ated by such claims might encourage legislative reform. 
The third scenario where a psychiatric in-patient might bring a civil 
action involves harm that occurs after treatment, once an individual has 
been released into the community. As discussed earlier, moving from an 
institution to the community is a leap that many do not make success-
fully. Little or no emphasis on discharge planning and continuity of 
treatment following release stack the odds against smooth reintegration. 
Some are able to make the transition and never look back; others 
flounder in their new surroundings and end up living in filth and squalor, 
penniless and without hope. 
11° Fernandes. supra note 49. Although the plaintiff Mr. Fernandes is physically disabled, not 
mentally ill, his case is still germane to a discussion of civil remedies for those who remain 
institutionalized against their will. 
111 See e.g. Brewster v. Dukakis, 544 F. Supp 1069 (1982); New York ARC v. Carey, 393 F. 
Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). 
112 Currently only British Columbia, Ontario, and Quebec have legislation that provides for 
class action lawsuits. See e.g. Class Proceedings Act, R.S.O. 1992, c. 6. 
113 See L. Pierce, "Raising the Roof on Community Housing for People with Disabilities: Class 
Actions in Canada" (2000) 6 Appeal: Review of Current Law and Law Reform 22. 
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If the plight of someone in the latter category is the result of poor 
discharge planning or the non-delivery of aftercare services, it may be 
possible for the aggrieved individual to sue in tort. This sort of case 
would hinge on the plaintiff drawing a causal connection between the 
doctor or care provider's omission and the harm which ensued. The 
plaintiff's case would also rest heavily on the notion that support in the 
community is indispensable to coping with and recovering from mental 
illness not a bold assertion in light of all the empirical evidence about 
the aftermath of deinstitutionalization, outlined above. Failing to plan 
for discharge or facilitate re-intake into the community would thus 
amount to a breach of professional responsibility by the attending 
psychiatrist or by the hospital itself. 
Although few cases have been tried along these lines, the idea has 
support within academic circles. Jonathan Bach suggests that the com-
mon law "recognizes a continuing duty of care that extends beyond the 
technical termination of the patient's institutional stay," and that failing 
to plan for an in-patient's future past the date of release "exposes a 
recipient of aid to reasonably foreseeable harm." 114 Similarly, Gray 
notes that community treatment requirements may exist in certain prov-
inces by virtue of legislation relating to leave certificates and CTOs. For 
example, a leave certificate cannot be issued in Manitoba unless the 
course of treatment described in the certificate "can and will be provided 
in the community." 115 
Still, it is unlikely that these actions would succeed in Canada 
because of the court's reluctance to impose duties on administrative 
decision-makers that do not arise directly from statutes. 116 Furthermore, 
where there is a duty to be met, the court will generally look to statutory 
standards to determine the level of care required - standards lacking in 
provinces like Nova Scotia. 117 In other words, unless a physician acted 
with complete disregard for the interests of his patient, it is unlikely the 
court will view his inaction as tortious, even if it is indisputably "negli-
gent" in the colloquial sense. 
114 Bach, "Deinstitutionalization", supra note 15 at 1161. 
115 Gray, Shone & Liddle, supra note 38 at 309-310. 
116 Gray, Shone & Liddle, supra note 38 at 310. 
117 The position most frequently taken in Canadian courts is that "breach of a statutory 
provision is prima facie evidence of negligence." See A.M. Linden & L.N. Klar, Canadian 
Tort Law: Cases, Notes & Materials, 11'11 ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1999) at 191-193. 
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2. Legislative reform 
i. The Least Restrictive Alternative 
The "least restrictive" or "least intrusive" alternative refers to a set of 
circumstances in which the psychiatric patient's freedom and autonomy 
is interfered with only to an extent commensurate with his or her 
medical need. 118 The "least restrictive alternative" is not the same thing 
as the "ideal" or "perfect" alternative because this would necessarily 
entail not having an illness in the first place. Rather, the "least restrictive 
alternative" is a workable compromise between the paternalistic im-
pulses of the state and the liberty interests of the individual. 
Among Canadian jurisdictions, Manitoba, the Northwest Territo-
ries, and Nunavut offer a legislative guarantee of the "least restrictive 
alternative". 119 The spirit of the "least restrictive alternative" is also 
represented in the Preamble to New Brunswick's Mental Health Act, 120 
and in Criminal Review Board hearings for individuals found NCR, 
where the Board must balance the interests of public safety with the 
rights of the accused to be placed in "the least onerous and least 
restrictive" setting. 121 Principles of the least restrictive alternative have 
been given wide application in the United States, with fourteen states 
adopting the concept as part of their legislative framework. 122 
Adding the least restrictive alternative to mental health legislation in 
Nova Scotia would help generate momentum for community-based care 
in several ways. First, it would send a message to health care providers 
that the rights of psychiatric in-patients matter, and that knee-jerk 
institutionalization is no longer an option. On a more operational level, 
patients seeking discharge could rely on a least restrictive clause to 
buttress their case for release. For example, mandating that psychiatric 
review boards consider the least restrictive alternative would have a 
118 At least, this is how I wish to define the "least restrictive alternative" for the purposes of this 
paper. 
119 See Preamble of the Mental Health Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c. M-10; Mental Health Act, 
R.S.M. 1998, Ml 10, s. 28(5)(d). 
120 S.N.B. 1997, c. M-10.2. 
121 Criminal Code, R.S.C., c. C-46, s. 672.54. 
122 Bach, "Deinstitutionalization", supra note 15 at 1160. 
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significant influence on these proceedings. 123 The legislation could even 
go so far as creating a presumption of community care, unless it is 
otherwise shown that the individual is a danger to herself or others. 124 
A guarantee of the least restrictive alternative would also encourage 
better aftercare planning and treatment, by raising the standard of care 
expected of hospitals and care providers (discussed in the previous 
section). The standard set by the statute, although not detenninative, 
would at least influence the court's perception of what is "reasonable." 
For example, if an individual's needs are best met in the community, but 
there has been no attempt to accommodate individuals of this type in 
their area of settlement, the local municipality or social service depart-
ment might be held accountable. This could inspire lawmakers to get 
serious about community care and the provision of affordable housing. 
The Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia recently considered 
the possibility of adding a "least restrictive" clause to the Hospitals Act, 
but found doing so would "create the potential for confusion" because 
the notion of the least restrictive alternative is "unduly broad". 125 This 
may very well be the case, but only if the least restrictive clause was 
introduced on its own, without any other changes or additions to Nova 
Scotia's mental health laws. A more comprehensive approach would 
answer to the Commission's criticism, as well as help bring the Hospi-
tals Act in line with Charter values. 126 This would include a clear 
enunciation of principles by which mental health care will be measured, 
as well as a set of "best practices" for hospitals in particular to help 
realize this vision. 
ii. Patients' Bill of Rights 
Introduced on its own, it is unlikely that creating a statutory right of the 
least restrictive alternative in Nova Scotia would provide the necessary 
123 For example, the clause could be inserted under s. 63 of the Hospitals Act which explains 
the "function and authority of (a) review board": Hospitals Act, supra note 72. 
124 The presumption of community care exists in New Zealand where hospitalization is only 
resorted to if it can be shown that a Community Treatment Order would be inappropriate in the 
circumstances. See Gray, Shone & Liddle, supra note 38 at 241-242. 
125 Nova Scotia, Discussion Paper: Mental Health Provisions of the Hospitals Act (Halifax: 
Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia, 2000) at 95. 
126 J. Galipeault, J. Hughes, H.A. Kaiser, "A Giant Step Backwards" (22 November 2000) 
[unpublished; submitted to the Nova Scotia Law Reform Commission]. 
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impetus for a restructuring of service priorities by the provincial govern-
ment. In order to move things in this direction, the government's com-
mitment to community-based care must be set down in a quasi-constitu-
tional document, such as a Patients' Bill of Rights, or what Gray refers 
to as Comprehensive Mental Health Legislation (CMHL). 127 
Although space does not permit a full discussion of what a Patients' 
Bill of Rights or CMHL should include, there are certain fundamentals 
that can be touched on briefly. A Patients' Bill of Rights should affinn 
the dignity of all individuals with mental illness. It should acknowledge 
the duty of the state to protect individuals with mental illness from 
exploitation and abuse, while at the same time respecting the right of 
these individuals to live freely in the community. 128 It should recognize 
that mental health is closely connected to other aspects of daily life, such 
as work, education, diet, and recreation. 129 There must be a commitment 
to preventative care and early intervention, as well as to offering the 
"least restrictive alternative" in the event compulsory treatment is re-
quired. A Patients' Bill of Rights should allude to the fact that discharge 
planning is indispensable to making the transition from hospital to the 
community, while CMHL could provide for administrative mechanisms 
needed to ensure this planning takes place. 
In addition to a general Patients' Bill of Rights, Nova Scotia should 
follow Kendrick's recommendation of adopting specific standards 
which will govern the operation of CBOs. 130 In November 1996, the 
DoCS released a set of interim standards for CBOs 131 but have yet to 
settle on a final version. It is imperative that specific guidelines be 
imposed on CBOs, especially because many of these arrangements are 
unlicensed and not subject to inspections like other residences under the 
Homes for Special Care Act. 
127 Gray, Shone & Liddle, supra note 38 at 313. 
128 B. Hoggett, Mental Health Law, 4'h ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1996) at 205-206 in 
Ibid. at 314. 
129 Gray, Shone & Liddle, supra note 38 at 315. 
13° Kendrick, supra note 42 at 152. 
131 Department of Community Services, News Release, "Interim Standards Released" (26 
November 1996). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
So the Etemal's anger blazed against Israel, and he made them wander 
up and down the desert for forty years, till all the generation that had 
done evil in the sight of the Eternal had perished. 
Numbers 32: 13 
It has been a long and often painful forty years for Canadians with 
mental illness since deinstitutionalization efforts got underway on a 
wide scale in the 1960s. While some have reached the "promised land" 
and found healthy, productive lives in the community, many others have 
been "left adrift" by a health care system which has often failed to 
recognize that community support and nurturing are as essential, or 
more essential, to well-being than all the world's psychotropic drugs put 
together. Still others have seen their hopes and dreams of living in the 
"mainstream" or receiving the "least restrictive alternative" dashed by 
inadequate funding or shortsighted legislative priorities. 
Justice for these individuals, it seems, staiis with the recognition that 
community-based care and treatment is a right, not just some loosely-
worded promise which is subject to endless qualification. Since it is 
unlikely this right will emerge from Charter jurisprudence or test cases, 
it is incumbent on Canadian lawmakers to take the lead and pursue 21st 
century solutions for people with mental illness, rather than quick fix 
"institutionalizing" or "residentializing". Passing a comprehensive Pa-
tients' Bill of Rights would be a step in the right direction as would 
amendments to provincial mental health legislation which create a 
presumption of the "least restrictive" care and make discharge planning 
mandatory. 
In Nova Scotia, the writing is on the wall: the current system is 
failing mental health consumers. Another report or white paper need not 
be unveiled to tell the government what Nova Scotians with mental 
illness have known for a long time - that housing and aftercare services 
in the province, while excellent where they can be found, are nowhere 
close to meeting their need, and that "a deep sense of despair" exists as a 
result. 132 It is only when a true path is created for these individuals that 
they will be able to end their wandering, and experience the "milk and 
honey" of justice and opportunity. 
132 M. Lightstone, "Disabled bemoan inaction on group homes" The [Halifax] Chronicle-
Herald (15 February 2002). 
